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The Experiential Sabbatical
Martin H. Pritikin

I. Introduction
Recent years have seen loud and frequent calls for reform in legal education.
The Carnegie Report1 and Best Practices2 exhorted law professors to infuse their
teaching with practical skills and professionalism.3 Many have heeded the call
and many law schools have supported such efforts. The number of law schools
with an associate dean for experiential learning, for example, has skyrocketed
in the last few years.4 One vehicle for reform in legal education, however,
appears to remain underused: the experiential sabbatical.
Sabbaticals became a ubiquitous feature of legal academia (at least for
traditional tenure-track faculty) during the 20th century.5 Their purposes,
however, remain a somewhat contested topic, particularly in light of recent
budget cuts, the media scrutiny law schools have faced since the Great
Recession and the weakening of the legal job market. Yet educators generally
agree that sabbaticals should promote faculty professional development.
If sabbaticals should promote professional development and law
professors should develop their teaching skills by integrating practice skills
and professionalism, one might think that law schools would allow, even
encourage, law professors to take sabbaticals to engage in law practice.
Indeed, some complain that law professors have become out of touch with
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the practice of law and lack the personal practice experience that would help
them guide and train law students.
However, few law schools allow law professors to take sabbaticals to pursue
legal practice experience that does not directly result in published work. And
at the law schools that do allow sabbaticals for such purposes, few law
professors pursue the opportunity to return to or enter the trenches of law
practice.6
Admittedly, self-interest sparked my interest in this issue. I teach and write
about criminal law, among other subjects, and I direct Whittier Law School’s
Institute for Trial and Appellate Practice. In these positions, I regularly train
mock trial students on how to conduct criminal trials. Yet, with the exception
of a criminal defense clinic I participated in as a student nearly 15 years ago,
my litigation experience has been in the civil arena. As I approached eligibility
for my first sabbatical, I wanted to use it to volunteer with a prosecutor’s
office. I reasoned that the experience would enrich my teaching of criminal
law, evidence and trial advocacy by enhancing my own practical skills and
exposing me to real-life ethical dilemmas and strategic challenges. I also
expected to discover new material for scholarly articles. Finally, I believed
that my professional network would broaden, which would give me credibility
as a reference for students seeking jobs and access to potential speakers and
adjuncts with practical skills and ethical insights.
As I explore below, my experience at the Orange County District Attorney’s
Office met or exceeded my expectations. Because I found my sabbatical so
valuable to my professional development in all areas, I hope that sharing my
experience will encourage more law schools to offer such sabbaticals and more
law professors to apply for them.
I. The Role of the Law School Sabbatical
A. The Development of the Sabbatical in Higher Education
The modern academic sabbatical began in the late 19th century, and
expanded rapidly throughout the 20th century. Harvard University offered
the first sabbatical in 1880 to attract potential faculty members.7 By 1920,
at least 50 institutions of higher education had sabbatical systems in place8
and by the early 1930s that figure had ballooned to 178. A study conducted
in 1973 of nearly 400 institutions of higher education found that two-thirds
6.

See infra, text accompanying notes 26–28.

7.

Walter Crosby Eells, The Origin and Early History of Sabbatical Leave, 48 AAUP Bull., 253, 253
(Sep. 1962), available at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/40222893?uid=3739560&uid=
2129&uid=2134&uid=379629941&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=379629931&uid=3739256&uid=6
0&sid=21103576925401.

8.

Id. at 254.
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of all respondents granted sabbaticals.9 Today institutions commonly award
sabbaticals as semester- or year-long paid leaves of absence available every
seven years, primarily to tenure-track or tenured faculty.10
From its inception, educators envisioned the sabbatical partly as an
opportunity for faculty rejuvenation and renewal but primarily as a vehicle to
increase faculty capacity for usefulness to the university.11 Whether the faculty
member returns from a sabbatical with higher morale or motivation, a more
developed publication reputation or enhanced teaching or other skills, the
student is—or should be—the ultimate beneficiary.12
Although sabbaticals have become pervasive in higher education, there
is no clear consensus on their actual purpose. Limited empirical research on
sabbaticals in higher education,13 none of which focuses exclusively on law
schools, reveals a general lack of clarity about the purposes a sabbatical should
serve. A review of 75 undergraduate and graduate degree programs found that
65 percent had only a general statement of purposes, 28 percent had either an
implied statement or no statement at all about purposes and only 7 percent
specified particular goals like teaching, renewal or research.14
By far, the enhancement of faculty research productivity emerged as the
most common way institutions expected sabbaticals to improve faculty work.15
Perhaps this purpose dominated because of the value that institutions, or
the professors themselves, place on research and scholarship. Or research
productivity simply might more easily lend itself to measurement than teaching
effectiveness or service.
In addition to the vagueness of purpose, little evidence exists on the
efficacy of sabbaticals. Some studies have found that post-sabbatical research
9.

August W. Eberle & Robert E. Thompson, Sabbatical Leaves
(1973) available at http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED072754.

10.

See id. at 16–17.

11.

Bruce A. Kimball, The Origin of the Sabbath and Its Legacy to the Modern Sabbatical, 49 J. Higher
Educ. 303, 304 (1978), available at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1979188?uid=37395
60&uid=2129&uid=2134&uid=379629941&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=379629931&uid=373925
6&uid=60&sid=21103576925401.

12.

Linda R. Otto & Michael Kroth, An Examination of the Benefits and Costs of Sabbatical Leave for
General Higher Education, Industry, and Professional-Technical/Community College Environments, 48 J.
Stem Tchr. Educ., 22, 24, 27–28 (2011), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/JSTE/
v48n3/pdf/otto.pdf.

13.

See Katherine L. Wildman, Staff Sabbaticals: An Examination of Sabbatical Purposes and
Benefits For Higher Education Administrators 21, 24–25 (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Iowa), available at http://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3009/.

14.

Michael T. Miller, Kang Bai & Richard E. Newman, A Critical Examination of Sabbatical
Application Policies: Implications for Academic Leaders, 15 C. Q. 4 (2012), available at http://www.
collegequarterly.ca/2012-vol15-num02-spring/miller.html.

15.

See Ketevan Mamiseishvili & Michael T. Miller, Faculty Sabbatical Leaves: Evidence from NSOPF,
1999 and 2004, 24 J. Fac. D ev. 11, 12 (2010).
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and teaching actually declined on average.16 At least two studies have found
that sabbaticals do enhance faculty development “in terms of tangible and
intangible benefits for both the faculty member and the university” but
that “pre- and post-sabbatical reports were an essential component of the
sabbatical.”17 These reports help to ensure that institutions grant sabbaticals
for appropriate reasons and encourage professors to meet the articulated goals
of the sabbatical.
B. The Sabbatical and Faculty Development in Law Schools
The debate about the appropriate role of the sabbatical as a vehicle for
faculty development within law schools is tied to the larger debate about
how law faculty should develop. Should faculty “develop” into trainers of
law practitioners or should they develop as scholars? If practical education is
becoming more of a central focus in law schools, a key question is what law
schools can do to enable law professors to better educate students for practice.
To some extent, law schools can rely on adjuncts or visitors to provide
practical training and assign tenure-track faculty to traditional doctrinal
courses. But the reform literature resoundingly rejects the divide between
theory, practice and professionalism in legal education. The Carnegie Report
urges schools to adopt an approach that integrates “each aspect of the legal
apprenticeship—the cognitive, the practical and the ethical-social.”18 The
notion of an “apprenticeship” implies the presence of a master or expert to
which one can be an apprentice. Not surprisingly, the reform literature has
widely acknowledged that law professors can and should serve as models of
competent and ethical lawyering.19
The difficulty with having law professors serve as role models for practice,
however, is not only that most law professors do not practice law but that
many have not done so in a long time, if ever.20 Those who did practice did so
under fairly homogenous conditions—no more than several years doing mostly
16.

Miller, Bai & Newman, supra note 14, at 2.

17.

Carl H. Boening & Michael T. Miller, Research and Literature
Leave: A Review 13 (1997), available at http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED414777.

18.

Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 191. Scholars are not the only ones advocating more
integration of practical skills and ethics. Survey evidence shows that law students want
professors’ teaching geared toward the realities of practice. It also shows that practicing
attorneys regret they did not get better training in these areas while in law school. See, e.g.,
Amy B. Cohen, The Dangers of the Ivory Tower: The Obligation of Law Professors to Engage in the Practice
of Law, 50 Loy. L. Rev 623, 630–34 (2004).

19.

See, e.g., Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 27, 135.

20.

See, e.g., Richard E. Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the Professoriate
and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. Legal Educ. 594, 600–05 (2003) (study finding
that most new law professors had an average of 3.7 years in practice, and that time spent in
practice has been decreasing).
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research and writing at a large firm.21 And they often did not particularly enjoy
the experience (or else they would not have left practice to teach).22
To better match law students’ need for apprenticeships with law faculties’
general dearth of apprentice masters, the reform literature for decades has
endorsed doctrinal law professors getting more practice experience.23 Some
have advocated using the sabbatical in particular as an ideal opportunity for
law professors to obtain this practical experience.24
But the question remains: how often is this really done? To find out, I
circulated a brief survey among the ABA’s Associate and Assistant Deans’
listserv. Representatives of 30 schools responded.25 They were asked: “Do
your school’s policies permit sabbaticals to develop skills/knowledge through
legal practice or similar work experience (assume that the experience does not
directly result in published work)?” Only a quarter of respondents answered
affirmatively. The remainder split equally between those whose policies would
not permit such sabbaticals and those for whom it was not clear if they would.
The second question asked whether, in the past five years, any professors at
the school had taken such a sabbatical. Here, the results were more skewed.
Only 10 percent indicated that such sabbaticals had been taken recently and
an equal percentage indicated that it was unclear or unknown. The remaining
80 percent indicated that such sabbaticals had not been taken. Together, the
responses suggest that most schools do not allow practice-based sabbaticals—or
at least do not make clear that they do—and that, even among schools allowing
them, professors are not frequently availing themselves of that opportunity.
21.

See Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the Moral
Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 705, 758 (1998).

22.

Emily Zimmerman, Should Law Professors Have a Continuing Practice Experience (CPE) Requirement?,
6 Ne. U. L. J. 131, 137 (2012), available at http://nulj.org/sites/default/files/files/NULJ-Vol-6No-1-ExpEd.pdf.

23.

See, e.g., Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 157; A.B.A. Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar, Legal Education and Professional D evelopment—
An Educational Continuum, Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the
Profession: Narrowing the Gap 271–72 (1992); Alex M. Johnson Jr., Think Like A Lawyer,
Work Like A Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1233
(1991).

24.

See, e.g., Edward D. Re, Law Office Sabbaticals for Law Professors, 45 J. Legal Educ. 95, 97 (1995); J.
Timothy Philipps, Building a Better Law School, 51 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1153, 1160 (1994).

25.

Survey responses are on file with the author. More detailed information about the data,
including graphical representations, can be found at the author’s SSRN page at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2421581.
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This is consistent with the fact that practice-based sabbaticals are so rare and
distinctive that they constitute fodder for articles in law reviews26 and media.27
At institutions that do not make it clear that they would permit experiential
sabbaticals, interested professors are unlikely to pursue them because of
uncertainty over whether they would be approved. Moreover, in institutions
lacking policies that clearly permit experiential sabbaticals, there is at least an
implicit message that such sabbaticals are not encouraged. And at institutions
whose policies do permit experiential sabbaticals, professors often may not
take them because of implicit expectations of publication or because of a sense
that pursuing such sabbaticals will not enhance their reputations and standing
at the institution or externally among their peers. It also is true, of course, that
many professors may simply have no interest in taking such a sabbatical.
The purpose of this article is not to exhort every tenured law professor to
return to practice. However, as I will demonstrate, my own practice-based
sabbatical is at least anecdotal evidence that such experiences can be a powerful
tool for faculty development in terms of teaching, scholarship and service in
ways that benefit both the faculty member and the institution.
II. The Benefits of My Experiential Sabbatical
Fortunately for me, the Office of the District Attorney for Orange County
already had in place a program that was very much in line with what I wanted
to do during my sabbatical. Their Trial Attorney Program, or TAP, is designed
for civil attorneys seeking more trial experience than they typically would
get in their practices. TAP attorneys, as they are called, spend two months as
deputy district attorneys and typically handle misdemeanor pre-trial motions
and trials, felony preliminary hearings and case resolutions through plea
bargaining. For better or worse, they typically have more limited exposure
than full time deputy DAs to the more ministerial aspects of prosecution work.
The TAP program has been in operation for a number of years and is offered
several times each year. As far as I know, I was the first law professor in at least
a decade, and perhaps only the second one ever, to participate in the program.
Orange County has a central District Attorney’s office and four branch
offices associated with various local courts: North, West and Harbor, which
26.

See, e.g., Suzanne Rabé & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, A “Sending Down” Sabbatical: The Benefits of
Lawyering In The Legal Services Trenches, 60 J. Legal Educ. 296 (2010); Cohen, supra note 18, at
643; Bobby Marzine Harges, Law Professor’s Sabbatical in District Attorney’s Office, 17 Touro L. Rev.
383 (2001); Michael A. Mogill, Professing Pro Bono: To Walk the Talk, 15 Notre D ame J.L. Ethics
& Pub. Pol’y 5, 32 (2001); Stacy Caplow, A Year in Practice: The Journal of a Reflective Clinician, 3
Clinical L. Rev. 1 (1996); Gary S. Gildin, Testing Trial Advocacy: A Law Professor’s Brief Life as a
Public Defender, 44 J. Legal Educ. 199 (1994).

27.

See, e.g., Don J. DeBenedictis, Professors Seek Practice Time: Law Schools Are Lukewarm on RealWorld Sabbaticals for Academics, D aily J, July 10, 2012, at 1; see also Bruce Vielmetti, Marquette
Law Professor Trades Classroom for Courtroom, Milwaukee Wis. J. Sentinel (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/marquette-law-professor-trades-classroom-forcourtroom-pv3th0p-138018698.html (“[H]er gig remains an unorthodox sabbatical.”).
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handle adult criminal matters, and the Juvenile Court Division. My TAP
experience was somewhat unusual, in that I split my time between the juvenile
division and adult criminal work in the West branch. The supervising attorney
for the TAP program believed that this would give me a fuller picture of
the workings of the criminal justice system. She also knew that some of my
scholarship had focused on rehabilitation, which gets greater emphasis in the
juvenile system than in the adult system.
Dividing my time this way did have some drawbacks. First, the juvenile
and adult systems are quite different with their own statutes, procedures and
practices. Just as I was starting to become familiar with the idiosyncrasies of
juvenile court, I was transferred to the adult courts and had to start a new
learning curve. Second, I did not get the continuity that comes with working
in one branch for a longer period of time and so may have missed out on
opportunities for deeper connections with colleagues and judges. Third, on a
more basic level, given the nature of trial assignments and scheduling, I might
have conducted more trials had I spent all my time at one branch.
Despite these limitations, the experience was overwhelmingly positive and
was deeply beneficial to my teaching, scholarship and role as an institutional
citizen.
A. Benefits to Teaching
1. New and Better Problems and Simulations
Working as a prosecutor provided me with excellent fodder for practice
problems, in-class examples and simulations and exam questions. Not only
did I acquire much new material but it came with the depth that only real law
practice could provide.
Consider just one case I handled at the juvenile division. The respondent,
17 years old, was accused of petty larceny for taking $14 worth of alcohol from
a supermarket. A few blocks away, he was struck by a car while skateboarding
across an intersection. Police initially responded because of the accident.
But when they arrived at the scene, they saw a shopping basket from the
supermarket and bottles of alcohol strewn across the street. One officer went
to the hospital to speak with the minor, who had been taken there for treatment
of his injuries. The youth initially denied taking the alcohol, but soon admitted
stealing it. A second officer was called and sent to the supermarket to review
the applicable surveillance tape. The tape showed that, minutes before the
accident, someone matching the minor’s description and carrying a skateboard
took several bottles from the alcohol aisle, placed them in a shopping basket,
and exited past the checkout aisles without attempting to pay.
At the trial, my two witnesses were the officer who spoke to the minor in
the hospital and the officer who went to the supermarket. Although the case
initially seemed straightforward, a clever public defender quickly complicated
things.
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The second officer reviewed the supermarket surveillance tape but did not
preserve it. It was erased in the ordinary course of business by the supermarket
30 days later. The defense28 sought to exclude the officer’s testimony about the
tape as unduly prejudicial.29
I countered that under California’s secondary evidence rule (unlike the
federal best evidence rule30), “[t]he content of a writing may be proved by
otherwise admissible secondary evidence.”31 According to Law Review
Commission Comments: “The nature of the evidence offered affects its
weight, not its admissibility. The normal motivation of parties to support their
cases with convincing evidence is a deterrent to introduction of unreliable
secondary evidence.”32 Thus, the defense was free to argue that my proffer of
the officer’s testimony about the surveillance tape, rather than the tape itself,
raised a reasonable doubt as to the minor’s guilt.33 But this was not grounds
for exclusion of the testimony.
The defense pointed out that the statute further provides that secondary
evidence “shall” be excluded if the court determines either that “[a] genuine
dispute exists concerning material terms of the writing and justice requires the
exclusion” or that “[a]dmission of the secondary evidence would be unfair.”34
The defense asserted that there was a genuine dispute as to the contents of
the surveillance tape, since the minor denied that it would have showed him
stealing, and that justice and fairness required the exclusion of the officer’s
testimony because the defense had an inadequate basis on which to crossexamine the officer about the tape.
I responded that, as the Law Review Commission Comments and the
secondary evidence rule itself made clear, a separate statute, Section 1523 of
the Evidence Code, governed the admissibility of oral testimony to prove
the content of a writing.35 Section 1523 provides that oral testimony is not
inadmissible (that is, it may be admitted) “if the proponent does not have
possession or control of a copy of the writing and the original is lost or has
28.

In juvenile court, the minor is referred to as the respondent, not the defendant. However, for
readability I will use the more common “defense counsel” or “defense” to refer to the minor’s
attorney.

29.

See Cal. Evid. § 352 (West 2012).

30.

Fed. R. Evid. 1002.

31.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1521(a) (West 2012).

32.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1521 (West 2012) law revision commission cmts.

33.

In juvenile court, a minor is not found guilty or not guilty; rather, the petition is either
sustained or found true, on the one hand, or denied or not proven true, on the other.

34.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1521(a)(1)-(2) (West 2012).

35.

See Cal. Evid. Code § 1521 (West 2012) law revision commission comments (“Subdivision
(b) explicitly establishes that Section 1523 (oral testimony of the content of writing), not
Section 1521, governs the admissibility of oral testimony to prove the content of a writing.”).
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been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent of the evidence.”36
Accordingly, I argued that because the original evidence (the surveillance
tape) was not destroyed by the police, let alone with any fraudulent intent, the
oral testimony about the tape’s contents was admissible.
Ultimately, the judge sided with the defense, ruling that the secondary
evidence rule’s “carve-out” for oral testimony of a writing’s contents did not
negate the rule’s fairness requirement and that admitting the testimony when
police did not take reasonable steps to preserve the surveillance tape was
unfair to the defense.
As an advocate, I was obviously disappointed with the judge’s ruling.
As a professor, I thought the ruling was defensible (although it raised linedrawing problems). But had the issue not been litigated, I do not know that
the arguments on both sides would have been fleshed out as thoroughly as
they were. In the decade that I have been teaching evidence, I have never
come up with a hypothetical involving the secondary (or best) evidence rule
that was so organically woven into the facts of a case or that warranted such a
close reading of applicable statutes.
A hypothetical based on this real dispute would present a good opportunity
for students to practice both statutory interpretation and application of law to
facts—two areas in which students often lack sophistication and need repetition.
At the same time, the legal issue did not require extensive background
knowledge of the field. The only raw materials with which the parties worked
were a few statutes, some brief Law Review Commission commentaries and a
handful of applicable cases. Thus, I could raise the issue with the students in
a “closed universe” setting with relative ease. I could also easily modify how
I present the issue, posing it as a writing exercise, an in-class oral advocacy
simulation or a question on a midterm or final exam, depending on the time I
want to allocate and the skills on which I want to focus.
But this was only the first key evidentiary issue raised in the case. Once
defense counsel succeeded in excluding the officer’s testimony about the
supermarket surveillance video, he moved to dismiss the entire case on the
ground that the people had failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime.
In California, the corpus delicti rule, imposed to prevent a defendant from
confessing to a crime that never occurred, requires that the prosecution prove,
through some evidence aside from the defendant’s admission, the existence
or “body” of a criminal act.37 The defense argued that there was no evidence
(other than the minor’s confession) that any alcohol was actually stolen
from the supermarket: there was no surveillance tape, no testimony about
36.

Cal. Evid. Code § 1523(b) (West 2012) (emphasis added).

37.

See People v. Alvarez, 46 P.3d 372, 375–76 (Cal. 2002) (Under the common law corpus delicti rule
“the prosecution must prove the corpus delicti, or the body of the crime itself—i.e., the fact of
injury, loss or harm and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause. In California, it has
traditionally been held, the prosecution cannot satisfy this burden by relying exclusively upon
the extrajudicial statements, confessions or admissions of the defendant.”).

42

Journal of Legal Education

the surveillance tape, no supermarket employee to testify that anything was
missing and no inventory showing that any merchandise was missing.
I responded by pointing out several key facts and inferences. First, the
broken bottles and the basket with the supermarket’s logo that were found
strewn near the minor at the accident scene suggested that the alcohol had
come from the store. The position of the basket and bottles in relation to the
minor and the fact that the pavement near the broken bottles was wet with
alcohol suggested that the alcohol had been in the minor’s possession just
before the accident, and did not end up there at some other time or through
some other party. And, since a minor could not have lawfully purchased the
alcohol, evidence suggesting he was in possession of alcohol from the store
was sufficient evidence that the crime of larceny had occurred. The judge
agreed with my position and denied the defense motion to dismiss.
It was relatively easy to defeat the defense argument, particularly given
the low threshold for establishing corpus delicti.38 But for law students, playing
the role of a hypothetical prosecutor, fending off the motion to dismiss could
be a meaningful and challenging exercise. The winning argument to defeat
the defense challenge required paying attention to small factual details and
drawing inferences from them—skills that law students often struggle to
develop. Moreover, on most law school exams, students are asked to argue
both sides of an issue. But a law student is more likely to notice factual nuances
and draw subtle inferences from them if she is in the role of an advocate who
needs to come up with arguments to win a case. I base this assertion on the
fact that I strived to use factual nuances and draw subtle inferences because I
was trying to win.
The last major evidentiary issue in the case arose when the defense sought
to exclude the minor’s confession to the police officer on grounds that it was
taken in violation of Miranda. I argued in response that if the minor was not
free to leave, it was not because of any action by the police but because of the
nature of his injuries. He was in hospital custody, not police custody.39 I also
38.

See Rayyis v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12, 16–17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“The amount
of additional proof that is required to satisfy the corpus delicti rule is fairly minimal . . . . The
People need make only a prima facie showing permitting the reasonable inference that a crime
was committed. The inference need not be the only, or even the most compelling, one . . .
[but need only be] a reasonable one. . . . Such independent proof may consist of circumstantial
evidence and need not establish the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (quotations and
citations omitted). Of course, appreciating that the burden of proof on this issue is quite
different from the far more stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to prove guilt is
itself an important lesson for students.

39.

Advisement of Miranda rights is only required when a person is subjected to custodial
interrogation. See People v. Mickey, 818 P.2d 84, 98 (Cal. 1991). What is meant by “custody”
is that a “reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe his freedom of movement
was restrained to a degree normally associated with formal arrest.” People v. Mosley, 87 Cal. Rptr.
2d 325, 330 (Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added). The police are not generally responsible if
the defendant’s freedom of movement was restrained by third parties. See, e.g., United States
v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1985) (“There are no facts to indicate law enforcement
officials were in any way involved in Martin’s hospitalization or did anything to extend
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tailored my questioning of the officer to elicit various details that collectively
demonstrated there was nothing about the encounter that was so coercive as to
make the minor’s confession involuntary.40 The judge found that there was no
Miranda violation and allowed the testimony. Ultimately, the judge found the
confession and the circumstantial evidence from the accident scene sufficient
to prove the charge against the minor.
Using my knowledge of Miranda’s “in-custody” requirement to shape my
questioning of the officer on the witness stand is a good example of how lawyers
often use deductive reasoning—they harness their understanding of the law to
execute a particular legal task. By contrast, in the classic Socratic dialogue
employed in law school, students are engaged in purely inductive reasoning—
the raw materials (usually edited appellate opinions) are placed before them
and their job is to try and distill legal principles. Having encountered this
Miranda issue in practice, I can now create a simulation in which students
review the applicable law and then craft and perform an examination of
an officer with an eye toward establishing or negating the applicability of a
legal theory. During discussion and critique afterwards, we can address any
misunderstandings about the law and evaluate the effectiveness of different
examination techniques in employing the law to the advocate’s advantage.
Thus, as a result of a single $14 petty theft trial in juvenile court, I
encountered three interesting evidentiary issues that I could use to help
deepen my students’ understanding of doctrine and how it is applied in
practice. Moreover, every other case I handled, whether it went to trial or
not, either raised novel issues of substantive, procedural or evidentiary law
or involved novel applications of such issues. My brief time in practice was a
remarkably effective way to expand and improve my repertoire of hypotheticals
and simulations for use with my students.
2. Deepened Expertise
Not only did exposure to legal issues in practice equip me with new
material to use with students, it forced me to more deeply explore issues I had
been teaching for years. And because I went outside my comfort zone of civil
litigation into criminal practice, I became more adept at certain doctrines and
gained a better appreciation for their relationship to real-life disputes.
For example, in my years as a civil litigator, I rarely if ever encountered a
genuine dispute regarding the secondary (or best) evidence rule. Because I
never litigated the issue, I did not appreciate the complexity of the statutory
language or the policy concerns underlying the rule as fully as I otherwise
might have. But after having argued—in two rounds of briefing and nearly
Martin’s hospital stay and treatment.”).
40.

Cf. Mosley, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332 (“[T]he interview was in view of and in the presence of
medical personnel who continued to treat defendant during the brief interview. We also note
that the questioning was not accusatory or threatening, that defendant was not handcuffed,
that no guns were drawn and that defendant was about to be transported to a hospital and
not to a police station or jail.”).
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an hour of oral argument—the issue in connection with the dispute over the
police officer’s testimony about the contents of the destroyed supermarket
surveillance tape, I am now an expert in the topic in a way that I was not
previously, despite having taught it for ten years.
Similarly, in civil matters, particularly business disputes, impeachment of
the credibility of a witness with a prior conviction41 rarely arises. In criminal
matters, by contrast, there is rarely a case in which a witness is not subject to
impeachment when he has a conviction history. Having now raised the issue
before different judges and briefed it with regard to a variety of offenses, I have
a much better sense of how a judge is likely to rule with regard to a particular
offense category and what kinds of facts judges actually find pertinent to
resolution of the issue.
I also learned how to lay a foundation for a new and different kind of
evidence. In my years of business litigation, the only types of evidence I ever
had reason to authenticate were documents and, occasionally, photographs.
Yet as a prosecutor, I quickly had to become adept at laying the foundation
to authenticate 911 audio tapes and transcripts, as well as police patrol car
videos. Authenticating these types of evidence involved somewhat distinctive
procedures, as well as different technologies: in my time as a civil litigator,
I had never had occasion to connect my laptop to the courtroom’s audio/
visual outlets to ensure that the jury could see and hear the evidence I
was presenting.42 And, although I was previously aware of California’s
requirements for admitting hearsay evidence through the testimony of a police
officer at a preliminary hearing under Proposition 115, this meant much more
to me once I was routinely required to lay that foundation in my own hearings.
I am not suggesting that one cannot competently or even superbly teach a
doctrine without having applied it in practice. Law professors have the luxury
of time to analyze the law in depth in ways that practitioners do not. And
practice is not a guaranteed formula for expertise. Even if one were to practice
for decades, he or she would not have occasion to encounter every issue that
could potentially arise. But I think it is fair to say that one is unlikely to get
the feel for a doctrine or to appreciate the nuances of its application as deeply
without engaging with it as lawyers do. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that
a professor would be better able to teach students how to “think like a lawyer”
if he or she has personally done so.
Aside from any increase in my actual expertise, my heightened credibility
as an “expert” in my students’ eyes is itself valuable. Moreover, when I tell
students about my foray into criminal practice, they routinely indicate that
41.

See Fed. R. Evid. 609; Cal. Evid. Code § 788 (West 2012).
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In the civil litigation I had experienced, to the extent that in-court technology set-up was
necessary, the firms I worked with usually hired outside technology consultants to handle it.
Conversely, the fact that criminal practice was (largely for budgetary reasons) in some ways
more “low tech” forced me to master certain technological issues myself. The same applied
outside the courtroom: The hard copy of the California Penal Code and Evidence Code was
probably the single most frequently used research resource in the office.
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they view my decision as a sign of my commitment to their well-being and
what they care about—becoming practice-ready. Thus, my practice experience
raises my standing in their eyes not only as an expert, but as an educator and
mentor.
My experience also served as a refresher about the limits of doctrine and the
centrality to practice of the types of skills that rarely get taught in doctrinal
classes. For example, during a jury trial I tried, the judge—outside the presence
of the jury, and not yet knowing that I was a law professor (let alone a professor
of evidence)—commended me on making several evidentiary arguments that
he had never heard before. He even did research and confirmed that my
arguments were based on correct readings of the law. Nevertheless, the judge
said, he was sticking by his rulings against me on those issues. Thus, getting
the “right” answer does not always translate into winning—a distinction that
students rarely hear about, let alone experience first-hand, until after they
graduate.
3. Increased Exposure to “Cross-over” Topics
Colleagues at my own and other institutions have noted students’ frequent
difficulty recognizing how concepts and skills learned in one subject apply
in another. They will learn, for example, about the “reasonable person”
standard in connection with negligence in their torts course but fail to see
any connection between that and, say, the “reasonable investor” standard
discussed in their Corporations or Trusts course. Or they will learn the IRAC
format for analyzing issues in their writing classes and fail to see how that
tool has anything to do with their analysis of issues in their doctrinal courses.
Despite being told explicitly about the transferability of these ideas, students
may fail to see how they connect.
In real life, of course, substance and procedure, as well as different areas
of substantive law, do not present themselves in neat, discrete boxes. A client
does not walk in the door and say, “I have a torts problem.” She says, “I have
a problem.” And it is up to the lawyer to determine which causes of action—
whether grounded in tort, contract or otherwise—may best serve the client’s
interests. Similarly, no matter what the subject matter of litigation, it is handled
in a procedural context and lawyers must use procedural tools to pursue the
strategic interests of their clients.
Understanding the interaction between subjects is important for students
not only to prepare them for practice but for the bar exam. The California
bar exam’s essay and performance test portions often include “cross-over”
questions that span two or more subjects. Certain subjects readily lend
themselves to be paired in cross-over questions, such as wills and trusts and
community property or business associations and contracts.
Before my time at the district attorney’s office, I was already well acquainted
with the importance and prevalence of cross-over issues. I have taught or
lectured in evidence, criminal law and criminal procedure numerous times
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in the past and these three subjects naturally overlap. I had even designed
an Advanced Litigation Seminar that focused on four facets—procedure,
substance, strategy and ethics—that a lawyer must engage and integrate at
every turn. But my field experience as a criminal prosecutor reminded me of
the centrality of cross-overs and also gave me experience applying cross-overs
in new contexts. I can now use this experience to help my students better see
how areas of the law weave themselves together into an organic whole.
For example, in my juvenile court trial involving the minor who stole alcohol
from the supermarket,43 the three major issues I litigated spanned the topics of
evidence, criminal law and criminal procedure. The secondary evidence issue
regarding the police officer’s testimony about the surveillance video obviously
involved evidence doctrine. Once I lost this issue, the defense motion to
dismiss on grounds of inability to establish the corpus delicti of the crime was,
in a sense, an evidentiary one, but it also went the heart of the elements of the
substantive criminal offense itself. And when this motion failed, the defense’s
subsequent attempt to exclude testimony about the minor’s confession on
Miranda grounds was a classic criminal procedure issue. By administering a
hypothetical scenario based on this case, I can expose my students to three
different subjects at one time and help them see how the subjects interact with
each other in practice.
Admittedly, there may be good reasons for segregating different topics
in the classroom. For instance, when I introduce my Evidence students to
Federal Rule of Evidence 409, which provides for the exclusion of statements
made during failed plea negotiations, I am faced with the logistical reality
that some students may have already learned about Miranda in their Criminal
Procedure course, while others have not.44 Although a defendant’s statement
that survives Rule 409 scrutiny may nevertheless ultimately be excluded on
Miranda grounds, I cannot in fairness expect each of my Evidence students to
accurately predict the admissibility of the statement if they have had disparate
exposure to the relevant doctrines. Thus, I typically tell them to assume that
police had complied with Miranda in conducting their Rule 409 analysis.
But my time in practice spurred me to reconsider my reluctance to ask my
students to handle cross-over problems. Opposing counsel routinely comes
to cases with different backgrounds or depths of experience with particular
topics and law students must learn to navigate such scenarios. Considering
once again my Rule 409 example, I could assign my students to role play as
prosecutors or public defenders, give them advanced notice about the Miranda
issue and provide them with background materials or a mini-library of relevant
authorities. Moreover, as long as students are being graded exclusively (or
primarily) on their Rule 409 analysis, any unfairness based on differentials in
prior doctrinal exposure is mitigated.
43.

See supra Part III.A.1.
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Either because different Criminal Procedure professors cover different topics at different
points in the semester, or because some students in my Evidence class have not yet taken
Criminal Procedure.
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Student fairness aside, efficiency concerns may counsel against the crossover approach. All law professors feel pressure to cover a lot of material in
a limited amount of time. The professor who teaches evidence feels she can
hardly get through all of the evidence topics she wants to cover in the time
allotted, without spending time on criminal procedure topics like Miranda. But
there are many different ways to structure an assignment or classroom time.
To go back to my Rule 409 example again, I could role play as a judge and
issue a written tentative ruling on defense counsel’s motion to exclude the
defendant’s statements on both Rule 409 and Miranda grounds. I could cite
relevant authorities in the tentative ruling, so students in the role of criminal
trial attorneys know what to focus on. I could even state explicitly in the ruling
itself that I am more troubled by the Rule 409 issue and want the lawyers to
focus more heavily on that issue at oral argument (i.e., class discussion).
Moreover, any assessment of efficiency necessitates an analysis of one’s
objectives. By adding a Miranda issue to a Rule 409 problem, I am undeniably
taking some amount of time away from my goal of covering evidence concepts.
However, in every class, each professor pursues multiple goals. If a key course
goal is to help students see how evidentiary concepts interact with concepts
from other fields in real-life practice, a simulation exercise may be the best way
to serve that goal.
Simulations also present opportunities to integrate application of doctrine
with other skills. For example, in my Evidence class, students are typically
presented with a “closed universe” of facts and are asked to assess the
admissibility of a given piece of evidence. However, such an exercise presents
a narrow window into what litigators do in practice and overlooks the larger
and more difficult job of developing facts within a realm of uncertainty. Trial
lawyers must understand their theories of the case to know what evidence they
hope to uncover, what witnesses to contact and interview and so on. And as
lawyers obtain evidence, their theories and strategies of the case often shift,
requiring them to develop yet more or different evidence. Simulations can
help students develop these critical skills concurrent with mastering doctrine.
One way I now plan to help my Evidence students experience the role
of lawyer as fact developer is by presenting two case fact patterns—one civil,
one criminal—and revisiting them throughout the course of the semester.
Sometimes, students will role play as trial lawyers arguing objections to
testimony or evidence. At other times, they may participate in or view a
witness preparation session to see how ethical issues arise45 and to see the
connections between what goes on before trial and during trial. Or students
may draft or respond to motions in limine or exhibit lists, which requires them
to develop coherent ideas about which pieces of evidence they do or do not
want admitted and why. Of course, at the same time, they will be applying and
reinforcing the doctrines we have been learning in class but they will be doing
so in a more organic way.
45.

See infra Part III.A.4.
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Professors and institutions must make their own decisions about their
student learning goals and their methods for pursuing them. But for myself,
my time as a prosecutor has reignited my passion to pursue multiple goals in
my classroom and has provided insights about how to better go about doing
that.
4. Sharpened Focus on Ethics
The integration of ethics and professionalism training with substantive
knowledge and skills is more than just another manifestation of a cross-over
question. To the practicing lawyer, ethics is not merely another subject, it is
a substrate underlying everything he or she does. Not surprisingly, engaging
with criminal law and procedure as a practitioner vividly illustrated for me
the ways that ethical issues interact with substantive, procedural and strategic
issues.
Witnessing first-hand and experiencing this ethical dimension from the
prosecutor’s perspective was particularly valuable.46 Prosecutors play a unique
role in our adversarial system. They are supposed to be zealous advocates not
of a client’s position—their only client is the amorphous “people”—but of the
interests of justice.
It was heartening to see everyone I worked with at the district attorney’s
office take this responsibility so seriously. They sought to vigorously maintain
the distinction between the “hard” cases (where they believed beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty but were uncertain whether a
jury would convict based on available evidence) and the “weak” cases (where
they had reasonable doubt about whether the defendant was in fact guilty
and which they dismissed). Although there is some talk in the literature about
prosecutors over-charging defendants to create leverage in plea negotiations,
I neither saw nor heard of anyone doing this. To the contrary, the district
attorneys were loathe to level any charge against a defendant that they did not
feel strongly was justified by the evidence. In one instance, a deputy district
attorney even criticized a colleague for retaining a particular charge against
a defendant until he laid out all the evidence demonstrating guilt. And they
went out of their way to promptly and thoroughly comply with their disclosure
obligations to defense counsel (although some defense counsel would no
doubt view this differently).
It was also eye-opening to wrestle with ethical issues myself. Often,
prosecutors rely at trial on witnesses who have criminal records and are not
always 100 percent trustworthy. Moreover, over time even completely honest
witnesses acting in good faith will have inconsistencies in their recollections of
events and there may be apparent discrepancies between different witnesses’
accounts. I had to make judgment calls about which details were material
46.

While in law school, I satisfied my professional responsibility graduation requirement by
taking a course called Prosecutorial Ethics. Unfortunately, whether because of the passage
of time without using the material or because the course was taught almost entirely in a
traditional lecture and Socratic Method format, I remember virtually nothing about it.
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enough to disclose to defense counsel.47 As an advocate, I was pulled in the
direction of non-disclosure and saw how tempting it was to rationalize that
something was not material. But there was the countervailing incentive of
not wanting to violate my constitutional and statutory obligations, thereby
jeopardizing the case, my own professional standing and the reputation of the
office. These competing pressures are not difficult to imagine but they are not
truly felt unless they are experienced in practice.
I viscerally experienced the human element of criminal law practice when
I lost a jury trial and had to call the victim and tell him that the jury had
acquitted the defendant. The defendant had been charged with assault,
battery and vandalism in connection with an alleged unprovoked alcoholinduced attack on the victim and his car in a liquor store parking lot. The
victim, his sister and his sister’s friend, all in their early twenties and none of
whom had ever appeared in court before, were all nervous about testifying.
Prior to trial, I took pains to explain to them all that the victim was not my
client and was not a party to the criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, I definitely
felt a sense of responsibility to him to win the case and I believed I had let him
down personally when I lost. Calling him and informing him of the not guilty
verdict was one of the more difficult things I have had to do as an attorney.
The memory of that experience drives me to emphasize to my students the
impact that their professional actions can have on ordinary people’s lives.
Surprisingly, I found participating in the sentencing of a defendant who was
found guilty to be almost as difficult as telling a victim that I had lost a case.
In the heat of trial, I am focused on the evidence, on my courtroom skills and,
ultimately, on the judge’s ruling or jury’s verdict. But once a case was won, I
had to rapidly transition into a different role. My primary responsibility was
still to do justice but it was not always crystal clear what that meant, particularly
because I found my own ego factoring into the calculus. On the one hand, I
did not want to appear “soft” to the judge and recommend a sentence that
was too light, thereby devaluing the conviction I had just secured. On the
other hand, having already won on the issue of guilt, I did not want to appear
to be adding insult to injury by advocating for an unduly harsh punishment.
And I certainly did not want to erode the credibility I had worked so hard to
build up with the judge. To try to set both of these feelings aside, I needed to
acknowledge that they were there. I could not have had this window into these
conflicting concerns had I not personally engaged in this role.
Perhaps my most illuminating case from an ethical perspective was one that
never went to trial. At 3 a.m., a 911 caller reported seeing a man in a parking lot
roughly dragging a woman to a car. When police arrived, they saw the defendant
pinning his wife in the passenger seat of their car, apparently choking her.
47.

This brought home for me the practical importance of having a third party (be it an
investigator or even another deputy district attorney) present whenever I interviewed a
witness. If the witness gives testimony that is inconsistent with a statement made during
the interview, the last thing a prosecutor wants is to be called by the defense as a witness to
impeach his or her own witness because of an inconsistent statement.
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Unlike the typical domestic violence case, in which the victim initially reports
abuse but then recants by the time of trial, in this case both the husband and
wife told similar stories to police at the scene: the wife was drunk and out of
control and the husband was trying to help her by forcing her into the car.
The husband claimed he was trying to get the wife’s seatbelt on and call her
mother at the same time. Yet the police report noted that this was impossible,
because the cell phone battery was dead. As the trial date approached, I called
the victim into my office for an interview. When she reiterated the story about
her husband trying to call her mother on their cell phone, I pointed out the
inconsistency with the police officer’s report. She responded that the officer
checked the phone’s battery nearly an hour after he arrived at the scene and
that it had been working at the time officers saw her husband on top of her. I
invited her to check her cell phone records online. Sure enough, they showed
a two-minute call from her number to her mother, made exactly one minute
before the time police arrived. In light of this revelation, our office decided to
dismiss the assault charges against the husband. It was not a trial victory but
it felt like a moral victory. It illustrated for me the importance of thorough
investigation and pre-trial preparation. It also powerfully demonstrated that,
although the ethical challenges lawyers face can sometimes be daunting, there
is no greater reward than feeling confident that one has done the right thing.
Had I not experienced these ethical issues and competing pressures in the
context of adversarial practice, I do not know that I would have learned these
lessons so well. Now that I have experienced them, I am in a much better
position to create simulations or otherwise develop lessons for my students that
fuse ethical issues with skills development and the transmission of substantive
knowledge. In other words, I can be a better role model for my students.
5. Insight into the Student’s Perspective
The longer I teach, the more challenging it is for me to remember and
appreciate what it was like to be a law student: the anxiety of being in an
unfamiliar environment with unfamiliar jargon, the desire to please and
impress my professors as well as my colleagues, and my frustratingly slow
speed in completing tasks that a more seasoned veteran seemed to do quickly
and effortlessly. Other professors to whom I have spoken have echoed this
sense of gradually increasing remove from the student perspective.
In my Criminal Law course, for instance, I am obviously intimately familiar
with the material that we cover: I am the one who selects the course casebook,
I design and refine my syllabus and I cover largely the same topics year after
year. Moreover, because it is a first-year class designed to expose students to
general principles, I do not focus on the law of any single jurisdiction. Rather,
we examine cases from across the country (and sometimes beyond) in an
effort to distill the ephemeral “majority rules,” plus certain Model Penal Code
distinctions (which are not the law anywhere unless and until a particular
jurisdiction chooses to adopt them). As a result, prior to my sabbatical, there
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were few California Penal Code statutes that I could cite from memory and I
would say that my teaching was none the worse for it.
As soon as I arrived at the district attorney’s office, I found myself thrust
back into the role of novice. Not only did I have limited familiarity with
California’s criminal statutes but I knew virtually nothing about the juvenile
justice system, which is quite distinct in many ways. The district attorney’s
office did provide an excellent two-day orientation, which served as a crash
course on the California criminal justice system, among other things. But no
one else in the program was going to be splitting their time between the adult
criminal system and the juvenile system like I was and there was almost no
mention of the differences between two.
On my third day in the program—my first day at the Juvenile Division
office—I spent the morning observing court proceedings. Both the attorneys and
the judge were effortlessly using statute numbers as metonymies for criminal
offenses, procedures and remedies, such as: “I don’t see how they can call
this a 777, it’s clearly nothing more than a 654.” Everyone in the room (except
me) had no problem understanding this code and responding accordingly.
The shorthand continued that afternoon in the office, as the deputy district
attorneys discussed their cases with each other and as I was given my first
assignments (a trial, a probation violation hearing and a restitution motion).
Within short order, I found myself flipping furiously through a code book
every time I heard a new statute number. Even when I was provided with
handouts that summarized a particular statute or statutory scheme or when a
senior prosecutor explained it to me, I still found that I needed to review the
statute several times before it stuck in my head.
I cannot overstate how eye-opening this was to me as a professor. In my
scholarly research, I come across new concepts and ideas all the time. In
the classroom, however—the arena of on-the-spot interaction—I am rarely
challenged with something entirely new and unfamiliar. Thus, when I explain
a concept to my students in class, particularly one that was already addressed
in the reading, I find myself somewhat surprised and disappointed when they
still do not get it. But being in the role of a neophyte prosecutor reminded me
that exposure to a doctrine once or twice—even clearly explained—is often not
enough to make it stick. Repetition and application is essential to learn new
material. Thus, my experience in practice provided me a critical lesson about
the importance and virtue of patience and persistence as a teacher.
My field experience helped me recalibrate my sense of pacing as a teacher
not only with regard to coverage but also with the length and complexity of
assignments. As a new prosecutor, because I was not familiar with procedures
and statute numbers, assignments that may have taken a more seasoned
prosecutor an hour may have taken me two or three times as long. It is hardly
different for students. They tend to take longer and produce weaker drafts not
because they lack intelligence but because they spend so much of their time
looking up rules and refreshing themselves about concepts. Because of their
lack of familiarity with the material, they also spend more time sifting through
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rules and authorities to try to distinguish those that are on point and persuasive
from those that are only tangentially relevant or altogether inapposite. Thus,
if my primary purpose for a writing assignment is to assess students’ analytical
skills and writing abilities and not merely their effort in assimilating doctrine
and sifting through sources, I need to be sensitive to what assignment length
and complexity will provide a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate those
skills.
I also gained the student perspective in a more immediate sense, because
I was a sort of “extern” in the TAP program along with law students placed
in the district attorney’s office for academic credit. For instance, while I was
in the Juvenile Division, my makeshift office was a computer station in the
library, sandwiched between two law students, one of whom had been a
student in my Evidence and Trial Advocacy courses. In some respects, I was
in the same situation as them and we were all learning the ropes. Much like
any other colleagues working side by side, when one of us was preparing for
a hearing or trial, the other two would provide advice and feedback. At the
same time, my former student reported that it was eye-opening to have known
me as a professor and then to observe me in a professional role and to see
how my knowledge and skills in one capacity informed my performance in the
other. Thus, the experience was illuminating both to me and to my student.
Of course, neither of us would have realized any of these benefits had I been
reading about criminal prosecution rather than doing it.
B. Scholarship
Litigating criminal cases exposed me to a variety of issues that can serve as
the bases for future scholarship. Many, if not most, of the issues that would
make for interesting hypothetical scenarios for my students48 would also make
good fodder for research.
For example, the best/secondary evidence issue I encountered—whether a
police officer’s arguable negligence in failing to preserve video surveillance
evidence is a legitimate basis for excluding his oral testimony about the
video’s contents—raises interesting questions of statutory interpretation and
of the proper balance of policy considerations that underlie the rule and its
exceptions. The issue also has important practical implications: for a variety
of reasons that do not amount to intentional fraud, it is not all that uncommon
(particularly in misdemeanor cases) for police to fail to preserve surveillance
videos or other evidence. Thus, by addressing the issue of the proper framework
judges should apply in deciding disputes of this nature, I am also making my
scholarship more relevant to the bench and the bar. Indeed, without having
practiced as a prosecutor, I would not have had a good sense of whether this
issue is of practical import.
My scholarship benefited not only from the issues I encountered in my own
cases but from discussions about other prosecutors’ cases as well. Much as
48.

See supra, Part III.A.1.
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occurs in a law school clinic’s case rounds, the branch head of court would
conduct weekly roundtables with the deputy district attorneys where we would
share evidentiary, procedural or substantive issues that arose in our cases.
Such issues included the proper interpretation of the overlapping but distinct
exceptions to the physician-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges,49
whether a defendant’s rejection of a pre-trial offer of a civil compromise with a
victim to resolve criminal charges could be admissible at trial when the defense
challenged the victim’s credibility by suggesting that he had a financial motive
to testify against the defendant,50 and which types of prior uncharged conduct
or convictions can or should be used either to establish a common scheme
or plan as “1101(b) evidence”51 or to impeach credibility under the California
Supreme Court’s ruling under Castro52 and its progeny.
Furthermore, because the deputy district attorneys actually enjoyed
discussing their cases, I was exposed during lunches and in hallway chats to
many more legal issues than those raised at the weekly roundtables. Although
I might have obtained some of these benefits by interviewing prosecutors
without actually working with them, it is unlikely that I would have been
exposed to the same breadth and depth of issues if I had not been among
them on a daily basis.
My perspective as a criminal law and evidence scholar was enhanced in
many ways beyond mere exposure to issues. As I got to know the attorneys
in my office, they shared their views about past cases or the broader criminal
justice system. It was illuminating, for example, to learn how wide-ranging
were prosecutors’ views about the appropriate use of incarceration as a
sanction and about the appropriate length of sentences for many offenders
or types of offenses, particularly in light of California’s recent “realignment”
strategy to deal with prison crowding. I have written about prison reform and
alternatives to prison but had never previously worked shoulder to shoulder
with the people who had a role in sending people to prison.
I also benefitted from interacting with other players in the criminal justice
system. In reviewing police officers’ reports, preparing officers to testify at trials
and hearings and discussing cases with them ex-post, I better understood the
challenges they face and got a better sense of what types of criminal justice
reforms can be implemented realistically. I also saw the ways in which police
49.

See generally Cal. Evid. Code §§ 990–1007 (West 2012) (physician-patient privilege); Cal.
Evid. Code §§ 1010–1026 (West 2012) (psychotherapist-patient privilege).
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See Cal. Evid. Code § 1153 (West 2012) (“Evidence of . . . an offer to plead guilty to the
crime charged . . . made by the defendant in a criminal action is inadmissible in any
action”) (emphasis added); People v. Crow 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624, 630 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
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See Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b) (West 2012); see also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
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People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1985).
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sometimes fail to act as thoroughly or diligently as they could or should.
Seeing these shortcomings developed in me a deeper sense of sympathy for
criminal defendants, even as I sought to fulfill my duty to vigorously prosecute
those I genuinely believed were guilty. This gave me a more well-rounded view
of the criminal justice system and a more meaningful sense of context within
which I can propose further reforms.
In my interactions with victims, I saw a variety of attitudes and perspectives,
which no responsible assessment of the success of the criminal justice system
can ignore. Victims are in a unique position in the legal system because they
are not anyone’s “clients”—yet it is harm to them that has triggered legal
proceedings. Anecdotal evidence of what victims want and think should never
substitute for broad-based empirical survey evidence. But it is an important
supplement, and helps ensure that the human element of the system is not
forgotten as sweeping ideas for reform are proposed.
It was also fascinating to speak with judges and get their ex-post views
about cases, which provided an incredible window into both the process of
judicial decision-making and the array of judicial perspectives. The public
defenders and private defense counsel with whom I spoke also had a diverse
range of opinions and perspectives. Even my conversations with court staff,
including clerks and bailiffs, were eye-opening since the courthouse staff sees
everything.
Immersing myself in a different context than I was used to also helped
me to think in new ways about familiar territory. For example, at the risk of
being overly general, criminal law practitioners tend to be more “civil” to each
other than civil attorneys. The root causes for this appear to be at least in
part structural: much of the animosity generated among civil attorneys arises
during the lengthy, expensive and contentious discovery process. But in
criminal cases, prosecutors are obligated to turn over essentially everything
they have, so there is relatively little time or energy spent on discovery
disputes.53 Experiencing this cultural difference first-hand has led me to think
about ways in which changing the procedural rules for civil litigation might
alter professional interactions and thus has shifted my scholarly perspective
on the issue.54
If I could have done one thing differently with my sabbatical, I would have
tried to arrange to spend time volunteering as a public defender as well. I have
53.

Moreover, the criminal bar is relatively small and highly localized, so the same attorneys
routinely work with each other again and again. The civil bar, by contrast, is so vast that
attorneys rarely expect to see each other again and are less concerned about “burning
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no doubt that participating in criminal law practice from both sides would
have given me a fuller picture of the criminal justice system in its totality and
thus would better position me to propose useful reforms on a substantive,
procedural or structural level.55
C. Service
1. Career Counseling
Emily Zimmerman has discussed the ways in which practical experience
should make law professors more effective career advisers for students—a role
in which they often find themselves. Professors with experience “would be
in a better position to inform students about different practice settings” and
“might also be better able to make connections between their students and
practicing lawyers because [practice experience] would increase the number
of practicing lawyers that law professors know.”56 My own experience has
borne out these predictions.
The interests of students who come to me seeking career advice are as varied
as the disparate areas of law. Students ask about which areas of law to pursue,
how to secure a job or advance in their chosen field, what the work is like and
the office dynamics and politics to expect. When counseling students about
the practicalities of law practice, I am obviously likely to draw on my own
experiences. Yet aside from my time in academia, my own practice experience
has consisted almost entirely of business litigation at a large law firm and a
smaller boutique. And much of that experience consisted of working on three
different high-stakes, multi-year cases for large corporate clients, who possessed
(at least from my perspective at the time) seemingly unlimited budgets to fund
painstaking legal research, exhaustive discovery and intricately fine-tuned
briefs.
Many of the students who come to me seeking advice, however, will not
be joining large law firms. They will be joining small firms or opening solo
practices, or going into government service, where time, money and resources
are limited. They may have no interest in business litigation, if they want
to be litigators at all. And because I teach criminal law, many come to me
specifically because they are interested in practicing in that field and want to
know more about what it is really like to practice. My experience at the district
attorney’s office greatly enriched and broadened my experience base, enabling
me to provide guidance to my students that is both more robust and more
nuanced.
First, in terms of what it is like to practice criminal law, I now have a
personal basis for my advice. I certainly had some basis previously, based on
my teaching, my research and my interaction with criminal practitioners. But
55.
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now I can relate first-hand the joys and frustrations, the broader philosophical
implications and the day-to-day banalities of criminal law practice. I am now
in a better position to help students assess whether criminal law is a field they
would want to pursue.
Second, I am in a position to better advise students about which skills they
should be trying to cultivate. I now have the experience of handling a relatively
high volume of smaller cases, for which somewhat different skills are required.
Caseload management is critical, but was something I worried about much
less when I was working exclusively on a single large case or a handful of cases.
With many small cases, each with a time horizon of days or weeks, rather than
the months or years involved in large litigation, one must quickly assess the
discovery and motions that will be essential to the case. Thus, speed, efficiency
and setting priorities for the most essential tasks are indispensable. Given that
there is relatively limited support staff compared to a large firm—an attorney
cannot readily farm out research, document assembly or other tasks to junior
associates, paralegals or secretaries—these issues are all the more important.
Thoroughly researched and expertly written legal briefs were certainly
encouraged at the district attorney’s office but there was no expectation that
this would be done in every case—there simply was not enough time. And
because judges in criminal matters have come to expect oral motions, or at
least shorter and simpler written motions, there is often not enough advantage
gained by submitting an exhaustive and highly polished brief to justify the
time it takes to write one. The ability to think on one’s feet is more highly
prized in this context.
Budding criminal practitioners must also reckon with the fact that much of
their time and energies will be spent dealing not with lawyers or judges but
with police, probation officers and associated personnel. Police department
liaisons are critical points of contact for securing police witnesses for hearings
and trials and for obtaining timely and accurate discovery materials for defense
counsels and for use at trial. A similar dynamic exists with victim witness
liaisons. A prosecutor’s interpersonal skills in dealing with these personnel are
a critical tool. And it is not enough to “sweet talk” them: a prosecutor must
understand and try to accommodate their scheduling and other professional
pressures. As one small example, a prosecutor should be extremely solicitous
of a police officer who has just worked a graveyard shift and is now being
asked to arrive in court at 9 a.m. to testify.
Third, I have experience dealing with different office dynamics. The
lifeblood of a large firm, for better or worse, is primarily rainmaking—bringing
in clients, cultivating relationships and increasing the book of business. And
from a law firm associate’s perspective, billable hours are, more than anything
else, what dictate bonuses and promotions. Trial experience or success at trial is
a relatively insignificant factor in evaluating associates, since few cases actually
go to trial—and, when they do, junior associates rarely get much courtroom
experience.
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But at the district attorney’s office, there is no wooing of clients because
there are no clients. The office represents the people of the state and it has a
monopoly on the prosecution of all criminal matters within its jurisdiction. As
such, there are no rainmakers. There are also no billable hours because there
is no one to bill: the deputy district attorneys are all government employees
who make a fixed salary no matter how late they stay at the office. The primary
currency for advancement in the office is the number of trials conducted, as
well as the success rate at trial. Thus, those intent on a career as a prosecutor
may want to cultivate a different skill set than those interested in civil litigation.
Perhaps because of these structural differences, or perhaps simply because
the branch offices at which I volunteered were relatively smaller than a large
private firm, the intra-office dynamic was different as well. My sense in the
large civil firm was not that associates sought to undermine each other but
that they saw themselves as independent units in a larger confederation rather
than as players on a larger team. Other than e-mails asking if anyone had
an exemplar of a particular type of document or experience with a particular
judge, opposing counsel or mediator, there was little collaboration with
attorneys not assigned to a given case. But at the district attorney’s office,
people liked talking about their cases and they were eager to help each other.
The unofficial motto was, “when one of us is in trial, we’re all in trial.” Junior
and senior prosecutors alike were eager to share their knowledge and give
advice based on their own experiences.
At the same time, it is useful for me to be able to tell students about which
dynamics are common to large civil firms and smaller prosecutor’s offices.
After all, politics is politics. In any office, there are certain individuals who
gravitate toward each other because of shared personalities, interests or world
views. At the district attorney’s office, one’s trial record is important, but it is
not everything. Much like the relationship between associates and partners,
superiors form a subjective impression of a young prosecutor’s abilities based
on personal interactions, reputation or perhaps just gut instinct—and that is
bound to have some impact on the speed and trajectory of one’s rise through the
ranks. And even if a supervisor favors a junior prosecutor, different supervisors
may have different circles of influences within the larger organization and may
be in position to lobby for promotions of those they favor.
Lastly, my time at the district attorney’s office expanded my network of
professional contacts. Not only did I get to know the players within the district
attorney’s office, I had positive interactions with judges, public defenders,
private criminal defense attorneys and even senior court administrative staff. I
am thus in a better position to reach out to people within this broader network
to inquire about opportunities for employment, field placements or pro bono
experiences for our students and graduates. And when students ask me for
letters of recommendations that will find their way onto these people’s desks,
it stands to reason that my endorsement will carry more weight because the
decision-makers know me personally.
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2. Administration
One of the capacities in which I serve my law school is as the director of our
Institute of Trial and Appellate Practice. The connections that I made while at
the district attorney’s office not only help me assist our students and graduates
as they seek jobs but it has helped me bring practitioners to campus and create
opportunities for our students and our institution in other ways.
First, through my work, I met both a district attorney and a public defender
who expressed interest in serving as adjunct teachers in practice-related
courses. One of them likely will serve as a coach for our competitive mock
trial team, which is one of the programs I oversee as director of the institute.
The other expressed interest in teaching or even developing an experiential
course. Second, I met experienced trial lawyers and judges who expressed a
willingness to speak to our students on campus at colloquia that I organize.
Third, one of the practitioners I met is also active in a local bar association.
By interacting with her, I have strengthened my ties with that organization
and opened other doors to contacts with potential adjuncts and speakers.
Fourth, as noted above, I was in contact with senior court administration
personnel during my sabbatical and have discussed with them setting up pro
bono, externship and other practiced-based educational opportunities for our
students. Fifth, as a result of these court contacts, I was able to secure the use
of a local courthouse for a regional mock trial competition that my school is
hosting.
Thus, by expanding my own professional network, I was able to add value
to my institution in a number of ways. And this was in the course of just two
months. I would expect the benefits to have extended further had I spent
more time in practice.
3. Service to the Community
When law schools talk about law professors engaging in teaching,
scholarship and service, the service typically includes internal institutional
service as well as external service. It should not be overlooked that the time
I spent as a prosecutor, representing the people of California, was a service
to the community. I was helping put “bad guys” in jail, I was negotiating
less stringent punishments for offenders when justice warranted it and I
was involved in dismissing cases when that was appropriate. I also used my
background as a professor to counsel and teach some of the more junior deputy
district attorneys on issues of evidence and trial presentation. To the extent
that law schools are institutions dedicated to the public good, I furthered this
goal in my own small way.
Moreover, there is something to be said for “doing well by doing good.”
By working in the trenches with other trial lawyers, I definitely boosted my
own and my law school’s credibility in the eyes of the prosecutors, defense
lawyers, judges, police officers and witnesses with whom I interacted. Many
were impressed that I had ventured outside the ivory tower to get criminal
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trial experience. Those initial impressions sometimes led to longer and more
involved discussions about the value of experiential learning in legal education,
thus providing deeper appreciation of the challenges facing law schools and
the strides being made by many professors and institutions.
If more professors followed my example, my foray into practice would be
more commonplace and of less interest. But I would welcome that tradeoff.
Indeed, if law professor participation in practice became more prevalent,
the esteem of law schools in general in the eyes of the legal community
undoubtedly would rise.57
My analysis of the benefits of my experiential sabbatical has focused almost
exclusively on the benefits to my institution or to related constituencies such as
students, alumni or the legal community. In case there is any doubt, I should
state unequivocally that my time in practice was also extremely rewarding to
me on a personal level. I returned to school more excited about my role as a
teacher and scholar, armed with a plethora of examples and ideas I can use
and more confident that I have the skills and knowledge base to effectively
teach and prepare my students for practice. It was invigorating to experience
new settings and work challenges and intellectually stimulating to speak and
interact with people in a variety of roles. And it was exhilarating to stand before
a judge or jury, making the types of arguments that I have been preparing my
students to make for years. Oh yes, and it was just plain fun.
III. Implementation Challenges and Recommendations
The anecdotal evidence from me and others, as well as various educational
theories, suggests that experiential sabbaticals would be rewarding to the law
professors who engage in them and benefit the institutions they serve. But to
be clear, my purpose is not to advocate, as some have done, that law professors
be required to periodically engage in practice (although there may be merit in
such proposals). Rather, my point is that, because experiential sabbaticals are
so well-suited to serve the professional development goals for which sabbaticals
are designed, they should be encouraged or at least unambiguously permitted
by more law schools.
In other words, if law schools claim that they are—or want to become—more
engaged with the practice of law, they should facilitate their faculty becoming
more engaged with the practice of law. As the Carnegie Report, Best Practices
and numerous other sources make clear, relying on adjuncts or clinicians to
shoulder all of a law school’s experiential teaching is insufficient. And even
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if a law school hires doctrinal professors with significant practical experience,
with every passing year that experience becomes more distant and potentially
less relevant. This risk may be particularly acute now, given the rapid changes
in law practice technology and recent market disruptions in the legal field.
Traditional doctrinal faculty would benefit from obtaining more practical
experience and their students would benefit from it, as well. Yet the limited
empirical data indicates that many, if not most, law schools are not making
experiential sabbaticals available or at least are not clearly signaling that such
sabbaticals would be permitted.
A. Documentation of Institutional Benefit
One reason for limited utilization of experiential sabbaticals may be
simply that many institutions do not want their faculty taking them. Losing
the teaching services of a law professor for a semester or a year can be a
significant financial and administrative burden. To be compensated for that
loss, law schools may want sabbaticals to culminate in a significant piece of
research—a substantial law review article, a book or the like. Presumably, if
a law professor can manage to engage in practice and produce scholarship
during her sabbatical, a law school would have no reason to complain. In
such a case, the professor’s time in practice is tantamount to the research she
might do before writing her work. But, if the law professor does not produce
scholarship at the end of the sabbatical, what does the law school have to show
for granting the professor time off from teaching?
There are at least three responses. First, as long as a professor produces a
post-sabbatical report documenting her experiences and articulating how they
benefitted her in terms of revealing additional avenues of research, improving
teaching and/or expanding her network or otherwise strengthening her ability
to serve the institution, that should constitute sufficient documentation of the
sabbatical’s worth to the institution.58
A law school may still object that such a post-sabbatical report, while
valuable internally, is not something that can raise the school’s reputation
within the academic community as a law review article or book could. But this
merely highlights that empirical research is needed to determine the impact
of experiential sabbaticals on scholarship. The limited body of empirical
research on the impacts of sabbaticals on faculty productivity has shown only
a minimal or even negative correlation with research productivity and teaching
quality.59 It may be the case that medium- or long-term increases in research
productivity or increases in the prestige of the journals in which professors’
scholarship is placed are at least as great or greater among professors who take
experiential sabbaticals as among professors who take traditional researchbased sabbaticals. If so, this objection to the experiential sabbatical is really
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based on a short-sighted focus on immediate gains, rather than on a longerterm emphasis on maximum benefit.
Third, law schools should consider whether the debate over short-term
versus long-term research productivity is itself too narrow. Law school
administrations should focus on getting maximum overall return on the
institution’s investment in the faculty member’s professional development.
Given that experiential sabbaticals by their nature are likely to be far more
beneficial to a law professor’s teaching and service than traditional sabbaticals,
it may be that, even if they do have less impact on research, the trade-off is
worth it.
B. Compensation and For-Profit Legal Work
A separate objection has to do with the logistics of compensation. Even if
a law school were willing to entertain practice-based sabbaticals in concept,
many law schools do not permit professors to be paid for work during their
sabbaticals.60 This would not present an obstacle to sabbaticals in prosecutors’
or public defenders’ offices or in legal services organizations, which do not
typically offer pay to non-employee volunteers. But it would present an
obstacle for law professors who wanted to engage in private practice during
their sabbaticals. Private practice may provide a broader array of substantive
issues, practice settings, interfaces with technology, client interactions and
ethical challenges than are available in the pro bono realms of government
service or legal aid.
Again, there are at least three ways to address the compensation concern.
First, limiting experiential sabbaticals to pro bono practice settings may be worth
the ostensible trade-off in terms of diversity of experiences. Having professors
engage in pro bono practice enables them to serve as role models to students
about the importance of public service. It also, of course, benefits the public.
Moreover, the limitations in terms of breadth of work in pro bono practice
may be overstated. For example, the Legal Aid Society of Orange County
provides assistance to low-income clients in general civil litigation matters as
well as in other areas, including advanced health care directives, bankruptcy,
civil harassment, conservatorship, custody, divorce, domestic violence, elder
services, evictions, special education law and taxes. Virtually any volunteer law
professor, no matter what his or her research focus or teaching interest, could
find a relevant practice area.
Second, precluding law professors from practicing law for pay during
their sabbaticals does not necessarily preclude them from working in private
practice. Many law firms have significant pro bono cases and would likely
welcome law professors’ assistance on such matters on a full-time basis for a
period of several months. Although the professor may not work on the full
array of matters that the firm’s attorneys engage in, being in residence at the
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firm would provide a valuable opportunity for the professor to experience or
at least observe first-hand the cultural, ethical, economic and technological
issues affecting the firm.
Third, creative administration and faculty governance should be able to
generate palatable ways for law professors to engage in paid practice if a
law school wants to offer that opportunity. One possibility is to require the
professor to provide an accounting to the school of all monies earned during
the sabbatical. Any amounts up to the salary provided to the professor during
the sabbatical term could be reimbursed to the school. Any amounts in excess
of that could be retained by the professor. Such an arrangement would ensure
that by practicing law, the professor is not gaining at the expense of the
law school. And as long as the law school requires a written report or other
documentation of the benefit to the institution, this would ensure that the
sabbatical does not become an opportunity for a faculty member to take a
temporary leave for personal enrichment without corresponding benefit to the
school.
C. Alternatives to Experiential Sabbaticals
If law professors want to take time away from teaching to practice law and
make extra money, there arguably already is a time for them to do so: the
summer. In other words, there is no need to reshape sabbaticals to allow for
law practice because a different feature of academic life, the summer break,
already provides a way to meet any faculty demand for such time. Again, there
are three responses to this objection.
First, given that professors usually spend the first few weeks of the summer
grading final exams, they typically would have at most two months during the
summer break to practice law. This may not be enough time to accomplish
all of the goals a professor might have for an experiential sabbatical. The
more time a professor spends in practice, the more exposure he or she will
get to different cases, substantive and ethical issues, law practice technology
and organizational culture and politics. The professor also would be
exposed to more ideas that might generate future scholarship and have more
opportunities to make new professional contacts and develop deeper ties with
their colleagues. At least one professor has indicated that even a full year in
practice was not sufficient to truly feel like an insider.61
Second, a shorter window of time for practice may limit the range of work
opportunities available to professors. I considered working at a United States
Attorney’s office within my region but was told that they wanted a minimum
six-month commitment. Given my administrative responsibilities, this was
more time than I was comfortable taking. But if I only had the summer break
available, it would have been out of the question. Law firms and other legal
employers may be less willing to invest the time it takes to train a professor and
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to shoulder the administrative burdens of hosting her, if she is only going to
be working with them for a brief period.
Third, timing issues aside, confining law practice opportunities to the
summer could be sufficient if law schools modify their summer stipend
policies. Currently, most law schools offer a financial stipend to professors
who engage in scholarly research and writing over the summer. This stipend is
designed in part to provide professors with an incentive to spend their summer
writing rather than making money by practicing law. If a law professor wants
to practice over the summer—whether motivated by remuneration, a desire to
improve skills and knowledge, or a combination of the two—the current system
leaves them free to do so. But what of the law professor who specifically wants
to engage in pro bono practice over the summer? Given that both private practice
and scholarship carry financial rewards, professors are given no incentive to
engage in unpaid pro bono work during the summer. One solution is for law
schools to offer professors summer pro bono stipends. Just as faculty members
usually must apply for summer research stipends and identify the writing
projects they intend to complete, faculty seeking a summer pro bono stipend
would have to explain their intended work plans and how they expected it to
benefit their research, teaching and service. Professors also could be required
to submit a post-stipend report articulating what they learned and explaining
how they intended to integrate those lessons into their future scholarship
and teaching. If a law school still wants to provide a greater incentive for
professors to engage in publishing than pro bono practice, it could adjust the
stipend amounts awarded to reflect those priorities. But the principle should
be recognized that law professors engaging in practice during their time away
from teaching benefit the institution and should be rewarded accordingly.
IV. Conclusion
To provide students with the proper training in integrating knowledge,
skills and professionalism, many full-time faculty would benefit from spending
time in practice to reorient themselves to the modes of thinking, doctrinal
changes, politics, pressures and logistical and technological realities that
practitioners face today. But many institutions have been slow to recognize
that the sabbatical—the classic tool for professorial development—can and
should be reconfigured as a tool to promote and reward such practice-based
engagement.
Anecdotally, my own experiential sabbatical was not only extremely
rewarding personally but appears to have delivered at least as much return on
the institution’s investment as if I had pursued a more traditional, researchbased leave.62 I have no reason to think my experience was unique.
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In these fiscally challenging times, empirical research to demonstrate the
impact of experiential sabbaticals would be worthwhile to help guide law
schools in shaping the future of their faculties’ professional development
programs. In the meantime, law schools would be well-served to re-examine
their sabbatical policies in terms of what professional development of a
law professor does or should mean, given the dramatic changes in the legal
profession and legal education.

